WARNING - This is long!
Today, I discuss the Pasteur Act, a new bill proposed in the
US Senate by senators Bennet and Young, with Ryan Cirz. You can find a summary
of the bill here
and the full bill (as it stands) here.
The Pasteur Act proposes a subscription plan not dissimilar to what is being
implemented in the UK and Sweden. The
plan will purchase a specified number of doses (or the rights to such) at some
price over a multi-year period. The
total commitment proposed over up to 10 years is not less than $750 million and
not more than $3 billion! The proposal only covers federally funded programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid, VA, etc. There is a statement that encourages HHS
to encourage participation by private payers . . .The bill is planned to assure
sponsors that they will have guaranteed income in the absence of marketing – a
delinkage between sales volume and revenues. But, will it actually work that
way?
Ryan Cirz: We have a math problem in the field. Revenues are limited by price x volume. Durations of therapy are generally short, so
volume is ~ number of patients. Either price
or number of patients must go up for products to be sustainable in the marketplace.
Enabling
higher pricing is the focus of the DISARM act (an Act I believe is needed to
make the PASTEUR act function properly and drive optimum behavior). The low number of patients can be solved two
ways: just wait until there are more
patients, or artificially bolster the economics by ‘buying’ access to more drug
than you need at that moment in time – the latter is what I perceive PASTEUR as
attempting to do.
I’m
sure some readers are thinking ‘if there aren’t that many patients, maybe
there’s no need and we shouldn’t spend taxpayer money on this!’ – hey, maybe
that’s correct. I will say 37 years ago
we decided <200,000 patients/year didn’t make a market, but we didn’t want
to leave those patients without treatments – hence the Orphan Drug Act. Here we are talking about a current market
size where there are only 10,000 or 50,000 patients – and antibiotics cure
people fast (unlike most orphan drugs) – so it’s no wonder the market is
breaking.
If
you are in the camp that you’d rather just wait until there are sufficient
patients for the market to solve itself, it’s important to remember the vast
majority of patients’ experience with an antibiotic is during its much longer
lifespan as an inexpensive generic. If
you want those generics to exist in the future, there must be a way to reward
the innovator companies (more importantly, their investors) during the short,
branded years after launch – then 10-15 years later, when the market is big,
society gets cheap access ad libitum.
There are other examples of this in the US. One is the State of Louisiana’s subscription
for HCV therapeutics for their Medicaid population. In that case, Louisiana
guarantees a purchase of a specific number of doses of these drugs at a
negotiated price (lower than the usual retail price). The company is guaranteed
revenues upfront. The State saves money over the number of patients treated and
– therefore – can treat more patients.
This is a win-win for taxpayers, patients and Louisiana.
1.
The subscription is for government payers
only. While this is a large number of
very key payers (VA, Medicare, Medicaid etc), it does not include private
insurers. The bill encourages HHS to encourage private payers to participate,
but how will this work exactly in your opinion?
Full
disclosure: I have no idea how this will
work – related though - I prefer a system with a de-linked incentive and a
natural competitive market. My fear is, without some sort of competitive
market, there will be regression to minimum standards to be eligible for a
subscription contract. There are infinite
parameters that can be dialed when designing and developing a drug and without
market forces, the pressure to strive for the very best you can achieve will be
absent. So I’m open-minded as we start
to really experiment and get specific with these pieces of legislation but
hoping we have a stabilized base of revenue from a PASTEUR-type system and
perhaps leave the private payer market separate so there’s reason to compete to
make the very best product – even within the subscription tiers – TBD as things
unfold
2.
If I am a hospital pharmacist, when I order an
antibiotic covered by Pasteur, will I need to pay the upfront price to stock
the drug before being reimbursed by a payer one patient at a time? I don’t know the answer to this and neither
does Ryan (apparently). But I suspect that hospitals will have to pay upfront
to stock the new drug.
3. If I am a sponsor, will I need to work to get my
product on the formulary (assuming I have to pay to stock the drug)? How much
will this interfere with the presumed delinkage of the model?
This is a great question
because it costs a lot of money to support formulary review. Pharmacists often depend on the sponsor to
generate additional data beyond what’s in the approval package – sometimes even
assembling the information for the hospitals.
DS here – In my view, Pasteur
will have to have a contractual mechanism obligating sponsors to support
formulary decisions in hospitals.
4.
If I am HHS, how will I determine how many doses
to order and how do you see price negotiations progressing?
This
is an open question I have – and where I could see things breaking down if
there isn’t a normal competitive market to supplement the subscription. The only super clear number to me is there
will be an annual payment and the totals for all payments will range from $750M
- $3B. Also, revenues from federally
insured will be subtracted, but at what unit price? The only information is a price floor, which
I assume is there to avoid enticing use over expensive generics like
carbapenems.
If
there is a set number of doses that must be available, that imputes a price per
course. If the number of doses that must
be available is determined based on disease prevalence, then could that entice
people to go for the rarest condition as long as it qualifies for the highest
reward? – why? - if I only have to supply super small numbers – I don’t have to
worry about cost of goods, re-stocking, or frequent pharmacovigilance
reporting…
It
would be important to see just a bit more detail on the proposed mechanics here. For a number of scenarios I can picture,
having some component of a normal competitive market may help counteract some
behaviors I could see going awry in a subscription-only incentive world.
6. If I am a sponsor, how will this
effect my development, post-approval development and marketing plans?
If PASTEUR passed tomorrow,
for me at least - I’d say no change right away to the pipeline focus. It will take quite a bit of time to spin up
the committees and see how the different tiers are defined. There’s even some funding to bridge that
initial period – Pandemic stockpile purchases and contracts that could provide
post-market development support.
We need to see how this
committee values different attributes – of course we can all predict the types
of things that would drive value of an award.
HABP/VABP label > cUTI/cIAI; including non-fermenters is a higher
value tier. (From DS – an oral cUTI drug
active against high priority pathogens would also be1st tier I would think).
But nuances around narrow vs. broad
spectrum (do I just need 1 non-fermenter or many?), what discounts apply to the
almost infinite spectrum of safety considerations, and my fear novel mode of
action, and not novel spectrum of activity will be the definition of novel
could swing the incentive structure quite dramatically.
So I’d do what I’ve always
done – keep a diverse pipeline of assets at different stages of maturity so you
can pivot as the rules change. Perhaps
some pipeline programs that clearly have no hope in the current reimbursement
environment (say a narrow-spectrum inpatient only program) you might push a
little further along at risk if legislation passes – but otherwise no immediate
change until we see how value is defined.
Post-approval plans – it
seems obvious that one of the goals of PASTEUR would be to provide some
incentive for label expansion. While
it’s not explicitly stated, there is language around ‘upgrading’ your
subscription tier at a later date. So
for example if I come up with a drug active against CRE/CRAB/CRPA and initially
develop it in cUTI, say that gets me the middle tier – but if I get a HABP/VABP
indication later, I get the higher tier.
I do like that it creates incentives to keep studying the drug post
approval – I know physicians want this.
It will be interesting to see if that could incentivize any adverse
behaviors – for example delays to market:
HABP/VABP labels typically come several years after initial approval –
so is it better to delay approval 5 years for 5 more years of top tier payments
or get my 5 years of cUTI payments and then take 5 of the top tier?
Again in the immediate
term, it looks like there will be PBS-style contracts to bridge those companies
that are nearing approval now – so I’d focus on making sure I’m in position for
those as the idea is they’d cover the post-approval costs and purchase some
drug to bolster initial revenues while we sort the rest of this out!